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source, unless "autonomy" is to maintain one's
own views against reason itself, which is a
possible view, but not one held by Kant.
Gould is correct that Kant is not a natural law
thinker if by natural law we mean a conception
embracing -the authoritarianism discerned by
Jerome Schneewind in some of Kant's
predecessors. But I see no reason to be governed
by such a historically specific definition of
natural law. I have no allegiance to the
expression "natural law," however, and indeed
would prefer to speak simply of "morality." I
chose it as the best way of making my argument
in terms familiar to legal theorists, who are in
the habit of discussing the relationship between
morality and law by contrasting "natural" and
''positive" law.
Terry Nardin
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

THE KANTIAN THEORY
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Immanuel Kant seems so often to be right, in
the eyes of contemporary philosophers and legal
academics, that his writings have taken on a
nearly scriptural authority. To find one's views
in Kant confirms their validity. To challenge
Kant implies reactionary prejudice, or pointless
iconoclasm. John Rawls has made so many new
Kantians in the academy that every scrap and
letter of the great Konigsberger's work has its
own scholiast, and school of eager exegetes.
Finally the commentators have turned even to
Kant's short late essay on Perpetual Peace
(1795), which closely follows a tradition of
proposals deriving through Kant's model JeanJacques Rousseau (1761) from the Abbd de
Saint Pierre (1713) and William Penn (1693).
The question addressed is how the different
nations of the world can live together in peace.
By joining the gaggle of Kant interpreters I
do not intend so much to question their
consensus, as to ask (of whatever Kant says): is
he right? I will briefly review Kant's proposals,
considering them as actual policies, which might
ASIL

be applied to contemporary relations between
states. Kant proposes six preliminary articles of
a perpetual peace, and three definitive articles,
supplemented by a guarantee, a secret article,
and two appendices, to maintain a universal
community
(Gemeinschaft) of political,
international and cosmopolitan right.
Kant's Preliminary Articles of
Perpetual Peace
Kant's six preliminary articles of perpetual
peace are practical and prospective. They lay out
basic rules through which existing states may
bring an end to hostilities and develop the basis
for creating perpetual peace. Kant intended
several of his proposals (2, 3 and 4) to admit
some flexibility or subjective latitude, so long as
their ultimate purposes not be lost. Kant's six
preliminary articles of perpetual peace propose
that: (1) No conclusion of peace shall be
considered valid if it was made with a secret
reservation of the material for future war; (2) No
independently existing state, whether large or
small, may be acquired by another state by
inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift; (3)
Standing armies will gradually be abolished
altogether; (4) No national debt shall be
contracted in connection with the external affairs
of state; (5) No state shall forcibly interfere in
the constitution and government of another state;
and (6) No state at war with another shall permit
such acts of hostility as would make mutual
confidence impossible during a future time of
peace (All translations here and henceforth by
H. B. Nisbet in Kant, Political Writings
(Cambridge University Press 1970)).
The first preliminary article forbidding the
secret reservation of material for war reflects
Kant's commitment to honesty. Honest states
that agree to peace would relinquish their
capability for war. This preliminary article will
be impractical in a multipolar world of mutually
distrustful powers. Full disarmament requires
universal compliance and trust. In the absence
of either, prudent states will retain their
capability for war, while working to create the
necessary conditions for peace. Perhaps Kant's
first provision will be a necessary preliminary to
real peace, in the sense that complete and
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permanent peace (in its strongest sense) cannot
exist without disarmament. As applied to
contemporary international relations, the trusting
renunciation of all material for war would be
unwise, and likely to provoke avoidable
conflicts between states.
Kant's second preliminary article of perpetual
peace, forbidding exchanges of national
territory, recognizes the fundamental principals
of self-determination and cultural stability. Each
society has its own life and history, which would
be destroyed by transfer or amalgamation. Kant
recognizes the folly of a single consolidated
world empire. This clause is elegant, convincing
and true, but should not be read to prevent
federation. Kant simply endorses the stability of
existing administrative borders and the doctrine
of uti possidetis juris. Each community or
separate republic must develop its own sense of
the common good and consensus about justice,
standing on its own cultural history. This does
not preclude a broader cosmopolitan citizenship
that encompasses all humanity.
The third preliminary article of perpetual
peace, proscribing standing armies, follows from
the first, concerning material for future wars.
Standing armies exist to fight, provoking
apprehension in others, expensive arms races,
and the danger of prophylactic aggression. Kant
proposes a gradual disarmament, which might be
possible in a just world of legitimate states,
provided that they disarm together. Kant's
further prohibition on the accumulation of public
currency reserves (which he sees as equivalent
to armies, since wealth can hire arms) makes
little sense. Governments need wealth and
reserves of wealth to serve their citizens.
Converting wealth to arms takes time, and even
poverty cannot prevent rearmament when states
are determined to do so.
Kant's fourth article, forbidding a national
debt, follows from his fear of public wealth.
Such prohibitions would impoverish the state,
without preventing war, and reflect an
unreasoning fear of finance. Kant's subsidiary
point that foreign debts may lead to war when
debtor nations cannot pay, has a kernel of truth
in it. His solution that states should band
ASIL •

together to prevent foreign borrowing seems
states
and
harsh.
Some
unnecessarily
populations may benefit from timely borrowing,
to fund the development of their local resources
and economies. Kant's view of debtors as
improperly enriched would-be imperialists
reveals his conception of Britain as the typical
debtor
nation.
Regulated
international
borrowing, by satisfying and empowering the
poorer nations, may be an important force for
world peace, because it promotes greater
equality among states.
The fifth preliminary article of perpetual
peace comes closer to the substance of
contemporary international law by banning
forcible intervention in the constitution or
government of another state. Kant's reasoning
reveals his conception of states as moral
persons, with their own political autonomy,
comparable to the private autonomy of real
human individuals. This analogy supposes that
just as individuals may foolishly harm
themselves, without legitimating someone else's
intervention, so every state or people may freely
harm itself, so long as it does not injure others.
Accepting any intervention in a state's internal
conflicts would (Kant supposes) make the
autonomy of all states insecure.
Kant's attribution of moral identity and
autonomy to states would be justified, if one's
aim were simply to establish a peace between
states, preliminary to a more definitive
permanent settlement. If one's aim were justice,
however, the equivalence would fail. Just as
individuals deserve liberty and moral autonomy,
so too do nations, but only so long as states
stand in the place of the individuals that they
represent. State autonomy is derivative, and
depends (as Kant recognized) on the collective
right to independence and self-determination of
the citizens behind it. Oppressive states that
disregard their citizen's welfare cannot claim to
speak for them, or to enjoy vicariously their
citizen's rights to independence. In such
circumstances, other states may sometimes
legitimately respond directly to appeals for help
from
subordinated
populations,
against
oppressive regimes.
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Kant's confusion between the moral
autonomy of individuals and the moral
autonomy of states carries over to his prohibition
of certain excesses or dishonesties in war. The
sixth preliminary article of perpetual peace rests
on Kant's assumption that a state of nature exists
between nations, which lack a court of justice to
legitimate their wars of punishment (bella
punitiva) against illegal behavior.
In such
circumstances, Kant suggests, wars represent a
form of trial by battle, to be resolved by the
judgment of God. Kant insists that such wars
must follow civilized procedures, in order to
avoid a descent into total destruction through
escalating mutual atrocities.
This last point makes a powerful argument in
favor of the laws of war, which Kant rendered
almost ridiculous with his rhetorical and
transparently insincere reference to the so-called
judgment of God (sogenannt Gottesgericht).
War is not a trial, but mutual destruction, to be
avoided at almost any cost. Different parties to
the conflict will be more or less at fault, and
more or less to blame. Victory goes to the
stronger (and often less justified) party, without
any reference to justice. Justice plays a part in
appealing for allies, or justifying measures taken
to win the war. Kant's sixth article misses the
decisive importance of justification (which he
recognizes elsewhere). When states are at war,
the more justified party may legitimately take
stronger measures to win or resolve the conflict
than the less justified party, whose duty lies
more in submission and restitution, than
vigorous pursuit of war.
Kant's preliminary articles look less to the
justice than to the stabilization of the existing
world order. Taken separately and individually
his articles hardly apply to contemporary
international relations, where international
institutions and finance have completely
supplanted the structures of his simpler era.
Taken collectively, however, Kant's preliminary
articles indicate a useful strategy for achieving
perpetual peace, by first stabilizing the current
administrative borders of states, then moving
toward justice. Peace precedes justice in Kant's
formulation, but justice justifies and perpetuates
the peace, when peace between states facilitates
ASIL •

their mutual reform, and more definitive articles
of peace.
Kant's Definitive Articles
of Perpetual Peace
Having established the minimum preliminary
foundations of a perpetual peace in his initial
proposals, Kant described his three definitive
articles of perpetual peace, which establish the
formal relationships between nations, without
which states must necessarily regard each other
as enemies. Kant takes it as given that only a
lawful (gesetzlich) state can be trusted. Only
states that share a legal civil state of government
(burgerlichgesetzlichZustand) can live in peace.
Otherwise, their neighbors must suppress them
as law-abiding citizens properly suppress those
individuals who refuse allegiance to the
common civil society. Kant envisioned three
types of legal (rechtlich) regimes, depending
respectively on civil right (Staatsburgerrecht or
ius civitatis), international right (VOlkerrecht or
ius gentium)
and
cosmopolitan
right
(Welbargerrecht or ius cosmopoliticum).
Persons without such constitutions live in a state
of nature with respect to each other, Kant
believed, and so of perpetual war.
Kant's three definitive articles of perpetual
peace follow from his conception of rechtlich or
gesetzlich institutions, without which there
would be no peace. First, all states' civil
(burgerlich) constitutions must be free and
republican.
Second,
international
right
(Volkerrecht) must derive from a federation of
free and republican states. Finally, cosmopolitan
fight (Weltburgerrechi) will be limited to
conditions of universal hospitality. All three of
these lawful regimes depend on Kant's
conception of freedom, in its older republican
sense. For Kant rightful freedom (rechtlich
Freiheit) requires submission only to those laws
to which one could actually give one's consent.
Rightful equality requires that all possible legal
obligations apply equally to all. Kant insists
these innate and inalienable rights (angeborne,
zur Menschheit notwendig gehorende und
unverausserliche Rechte) forbid all relations of
unequal power among citizens, except
distinctions derived from merit alone.
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Kant's powerful commitment to this natural
law of reason determines his conclusion that
only republican constitutions can sustain a
perpetual peace. Kant's conception of the
republic depends on the equal freedom
(Freiheit) of all members of society; their equal
dependence upon the civil law (Gesetz); and
their
equality
(Gleichheit) as citizens.
Republican
constitutions
are the only
constitutions that citizens as equals could agree
upon, because republics spring directly from the
concept of right (Rechtsbegrifj), and require the
consent of their citizens to any public decision.
Kant believed that republican citizens armed
with the vote would reject war as pernicious to
their own well being, while non-republics
embrace war, to enrich those in charge.
These last remarks might lead (have led)
some commentators on Kant to confuse the
republican constitution with democracy. This
would be mistaken. Kant followed Rousseau and
his classical sources in believing that
democracies will always be despotic, unless they
separate their legislative and executive powers.
Republics, Kant believed (in common with his
contemporary James Madison and most other
self-styled republicans of the period), will
combine the separation of powers with
representation or election to executive offices, so
that each public officer remains a servant of the
state. Kant suggested that the absence of
representation will always result in despotism of
one, a few, or the many, which amounts to a
state of war, in which no one's rights are
observed.
Kant's first definitive article confirms his
commitment to justice as the basis of perpetual
peace. Kant rightly concedes that there will be
no peace or safety for the subjects of any state
that disregards the inalienable republican civil
rights to freedom, equality and law. This adds
very little to his underdeveloped concept of
republican government, which is restricted (in
PerpetualPeace) to requiring representation, the
separation of powers, and implied doctrines of
popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Kant's
contemporaries
John
Adams,
Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison provided more
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nuanced descriptions of the republic, as did
earlier authors such as James Harrington and the
Baron de Montesquieu. Nothing Kant says
contradicts their more detailed republican
prescriptions for checks and balances, elected
senates, and life terms for judges. Kant simply
does not address the details of republican
government, in an essay dedicated to the
relationship between states.
The position of the republic as the basis of
world peace becomes much clearer in Kant's
second definitive article of perpetual peace,
basing his ius gentium on a federation of
republics or federal free states. This international
constitution would correspond to the civil
constitution of its several member states, by
securing the rights of each state against the
others. Kant emphatically rejects the possibility
of an international or world state. He wants a
Volkerbund, not a Volkerstaat. The difference
lies in maintaining each people's separate
identity in separate republics. Each republic
must be an equal member of the international
federation of peoples, just as every person must
be equally a citizen of his or her separate
component nation, within the federation.
Kant had no patience for disorganized
(gesetzlos)
peoples,
without
republican
government, and did not see why he should
accord any respect to disorganized states that
reject the republican federation. Lawless states
like lawless persons naturally express the inborn
depravity
of universal
human
nature.
(Bosartigkeit der menschlichen Natur). Kant
believed that only republican structures of
government will bring out the moral capacity of
human nature sufficiently to overcome this
natural propensity to vice. Even after peoples
acquire a lawful internal constitution (eine
rechtliche Verfassung), Kant believed that they
would continue to need a permanent overarching
pacific federation (foedus pacificum), to
preserve each state's proper freedom, as a
separate lawful republic.
This idea of federalism, gradually extending
to encompass all states, seemed attainable to
Kant, if ever a powerful and enlightened nation
could form itself into a republic, as a beacon of
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justice to the world. The recent examples of
France and the United States may have given
some encouragement to Kant's expectation that
other states would flock to form a federation
around powerful republics, if given the chance.
In any case, Kant firmly believed that reason
mandates free federalism (frei Fderalism) as
the ultimate shield of individual rights. Just as
individuals must renounce their savage and
lawless condition through public coercive laws,
so states must accept an enduring and gradually
expanding republican federation to prevent war.
Kant's proposal may seem somewhat unreal,
in the midst of global lawlessness and war. In
fact, Kant contemplated an arrangement
considerably short of his ideal world republic
(Weltrepublik or civitas gentium). Kant's second
definitive article of perpetual peace clarifies the
first by extending republican principles from
individuals to peoples. Ideally the international
federation should have its own enforcement
mechanisms, and public coercive laws. Lacking
these, Kant hoped that a weaker federation
would at least limit the force of universal human
inclinations to injure others, independence of
law.
The third definitive article of perpetual peace
concerns cosmopolitan right (Weltbargerrecht or
ius cosmopoliticum), which is to say, right
growing out of the relationship between
individuals (and states) as citizens of the
universal state of mankind. Kant would restrict
cosmopolitan right to the rule of universal
hospitality. This requires non-hostility to foreign
states and foreign nationals, so that no one kills,
enslaves or maltreats them, without good reason.
Kant believed that foreigners may legitimately
be excluded from entry into independent
republics (unless their lives are in danger), but
expected that friendly overtures would lead to
commerce, and gradually to a cosmopolitan
constitution (weltbirgerlich Verfassung).
Kant's conception of right thus depends on
three imagined codices of unwritten law
concerning the ius civitatis, ius gentium, and ius
cosmopoliticum respectively. Natural law
implies fundamental human rights, which only a
republican civil constitution can secure or
ASIL •

maintain. Protecting republican states against
outsiders (and each other) requires an
international federation of republican peoples, to
govern their mutual relations. Finally, this
republican federation will fail to develop or
survive without an attitude of universal
hospitality.
These three categories of natural law or right
(Recht) do not represent three levels of duty, as
one might expect, but rather, two related systems
of obligation, overlayed (or undergirded) by a
separate and dominant requirement, applicable
to both. The ius civitatis (concerning the right
of citizens) and the ius gentium (concerning the
right of peoples) contain within them the
universe of public obligations. The ius
cosmopoliticum embodies the one simple rule
that leads (in the end) to developing the rest.
Not doing harm to others by simply avoiding
hostility will lead to community, Kant believed,
as people naturally seek the mutual benefits of
commerce and association. People will wish to
interact, and doing so without hostility will
produce the benefits of natural right, within and
between all peoples.
Kant's Definitive Articles of Perpetual Peace
constitute the essence of his proposal,
unrestricted (unlike the preliminary articles) to
specific circumstances of time and place. The
threefold project of (1) republican constitutions,
(2) republican federation and (3) general (armslength) non-hostility between states (and
individuals) provides a convincing model for
developing peace and justice from a common
foundation
of
republican
politics.
A
weltburgerlich attitude on the part of persons
and states will lead to better mutual
understanding, interdependence, and peace;
whether such an attitude will ever actually
develop
remains
to
be seen.
Kant's
republicanism is convincing and morally sound
(though politically underdeveloped), but the
non-republican institutions of existing states,
and their less than weltburgerlich attitude, make
it seem a bit utopian, so long as existing regimes
maintain their less-than republican political
views and institutions.
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The Guarantee of Perpetual Peace

Kant would have responded to this criticism
by reiterating his argument that peace and justice
both depend, and will in the end both arise and
prevail, from the inborn structures and desires of
ordinary human nature. This optimistic doctrine
supplies what Kant identified as the ultimate
guarantee (Garantie) of perpetual peace. Kant
supposed that inherent structures of nature
would bring humans into concord, even against
their will, so that the moral ends which people
ought in any case to pursue, as prescribed by
reason, will also naturally result from their selfseeking greed and ambition. Kant suggested that
all three types of public right ius civitatis, ius
gentium, and ius cosmopoliticum will follow
eventually from nature, with or without any
deliberate human commitment to justice.
In order to secure their own ambition, with
mutual protection against each other's avarice
and self-interest, people will form states (Kant
supposed) with civil laws to bind them. To
strengthen their own state's interests against the
rest, even wicked citizens and states must seek
republican confederations. Kant embraced the
republican conclusion, already well articulated
by James Harrington, John Adams, and many
others, that even a nation of devils would
gradually establish the checks and balances of
republican government, to control each other's
self-interest by the oversight of the rest, so that
ambition would counteract ambition, and public
interest rule, despite the avarice and bad
intentions still eagerly raging in each private
devil's own secret heart.
This mechanism of nature (Mechanism der
Natur), by which selfish inclinations are
naturally opposed to one another, compels
submission to coercive laws, which in turn
preserves peace (as Kant believed), both within
and between states. Good morals follow good
laws, and dissipate without them. Thus nature
irresistibly
determines
that
right
will
(eventually) gain the upper hand. (Die Natur
will unwiderstehlich, das Recht zuletzt die
Obergewalt erhalte). Virtue and good will do
not matter so much, according to Kant's
conception of nature, because right follows from
ASIL -

selfish conflict, through an equilibrium of power
among vigorous rivals, within and between
states. Thus nature wisely separates the nations,
and Kant would keep them separate, to maintain
justice, in perpetual peace.
As separation prevents despotism, Kant
believed, so to commerce assures unity and
peace among nations, by offering an economic
incentive against war. These two forces supply
nature's guarantee of lasting peace. Using
(to
support
rivalry,
self-interest
Staatsburgerrecht and V6lkerrecht) and avarice
(to support Welbuirgerrecht), nature maintains
peace by the universal mechanism of natural
human inclination. This is not to say, however,
that justice and peace now actually exist (or ever
have done). Rather, Kant hopes to establish that
nature supplies the materials for perpetual peace,
to be gradually channeled and implemented, by
those who have the wit to do so.
This constitutes Kant's secret article of
perpetual peace. Philosophers have studied and
explained the mechanisms of peace in
government and international relations. Kant
suggests that governments should make use of
this wisdom (without attribution). He does not
want philosopher kings, or king philosophers but
only that kings should secretly implement the
philosophers' insights, in pursuit of perpetual
peace. Power corrupts, and corruption misleads
the public councils. But philosophers have no
power, which frees them to think, and better
understand the state.
Kant's secret article supplies some of the
deficiencies of his earlier guarantee, by
acknowledging the extent to which nature
requires guidance in realizing its ends. The
whole history of the world reveals a procession
of violence and injustice so seldom interrupted,
as to undermine the plausibility of natural
providence or nature's benevolence to man.
Nature supplies the materials for human felicity
without creating the political structures to
support them. The science of politics determines
the best system of political checks and balances
to harness nature in pursuit of republican
government, and social justice for all. Creating
just constitutions requires active philosophy and

2223 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW - WASHINGTON, DC 20008

- 1999

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY ° 49

VOLUME 5

iNTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY * 49

VOLUME 5
human intervention. The greatest weakness of
Kant's essay on perpetual peace is his lack of
specificity about the structures needed to secure
and preserve a lawful republican state.
The Identity of International Law,
Morals, and Politics
Kant's sanguine reliance on nature's
guarantee of perpetual peace reflects his greater
interest in moral rather than in political
questions. Both appendices to his essay on
perpetual peace explain all politics (international
and international), as applied branches of right
or justice, for which morals supply the
theoretical foundation. This means that morals
and true politics never conflict. Politics, properly
understood, realize the absolutely binding moral
laws by which all actions ought to be governed,
so that anyone who wishes to know her or his
own civic duty may do so, simply by consulting
the inborn reason that all of us possess. Kant
knew that practical political maxims must
consider the actual structure of human nature,
including its weaknesses. Good Kantian
politicians and statesmen will continuously
examine their political institutions, to ensure
their conformity with natural law or right
(Naturrecht).
Kantian politicians will not, of course,
destroy the existing bonds of any political or
cosmopolitan community before they have
something better to put in their place, but they
will always continue to maintain a course
towards eventual reforms to realize political
justice (die nach Rechtsgesetzen beste
Verfassung). Kant hoped that politicians would
rule as much as possible in a republican
(republikanisch) manner, while adjusting the
constitution gradually to be itself more
republican, and just. Kant concluded that any
natural law respecting constitution (rechtliche),
even if it is not very lawful (rechtmassig) itself,
will be better than no constitution at all.
Revolutions and invasions should not occur,
unless they will make things better.
Kant observed that international society does
not possess and should never obtain the despotic
right to formulate coercive laws for mechanical
ASIL •

application by lawyers. Nations must rely
instead on the application of reason to universal
principles of freedom, to justify their public
actions and political constitutions to others. This
follows the normal international practice of
public argument by reference to public right
(offentlich Recht). Even when states and lawyers
argue insincerely, their insincere references to
public right and justice confirm these concepts'
irreducible value, as sources of international
obligation,
applying
Kant's
fundamental
principle of right, which is always to act in such
a way that you could wish your maxim to be the
universal law.
Kant's conceptions of political, international
and cosmopolitan right are the moral constructs
of reason, and universally binding.
He
considered that genuinely republican (echtrepublikanisch) government will best secure the
obedience and prosperity of the people, so long
as politicians introduce it gradually, seizing
favorable circumstances, without recourse to
hasty, or violent innovation. Kant expected that
peace would follow justice, when the general
will (allgemeine Wille) discovers the concept of
right (Rechtsbegriffi, among or between peoples,
on the basis of freedom and equality. "Fiat
iustitia,pereat mundus" -- for Kant justice came
first, and everything else would follow.
Kant's formula for perpetual peace required
first that the state should have an internal
constitution organized in accordance with pure
principles of right. (eine nach reinen
Rechtsprinzipien
eingerichtete
innere
Verfassung des Staats) and second that it should
unite with other states to form some sort of
federal union (allgemein Staat). Morality, law
and politics go together. Without justice, there
will be no peace. Kant was confident that human
reason will gradually apply moral principles to
secure justice, helping right to increase, since all
right comes from justice (Gerechtigkeit).
This identity between international law,
morals and politics demands a more detailed
description of republican institutions, at both the
national and the federal level, than Kant is ever
willing to provide. To claim (as Kant does) that
republican institutions will find and implement
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justice, requires some description of what
republican institutions will look like. Perpetual
Peace avoids the specifics. Kant's specificity lies
instead in his moral formula or calculus, to act in
such a way that you could wish your maxim to
be the universal law. This leaves the politics too
vague to reach any definite understandings, or to
resolve any disagreements about justice, which
may arise between citizens or states.
The Transcendental Concept
of Public Right
Kant concluded his essay on perpetual peace
by supplying a new more detailed formula with
which to calculate the content of public justice
or right, which forms (as he understands it) the
only lasting basis of peace. Kant's conception of
public right depends on publicity as the final
measure of law and justice. Kant's rule holds
that all maxims of action that cannot be made
public are wrong, while all maxims that require
publicity in order to succeed must be right, in
morals as well as politics.
This
formal
attribute of publicness
(Publizitdt) epitomizes in a single phrase all
Kant's philosophy of right, both ethical and
juridical. Kant argues that every claim of right
must have this public quality. Concerning the
Staatsrecht or ius civitatis (for example), Kant
denies the right of rebellion against unjust
tyrants, because such a principle could never be
openly accepted, as part of a civil constitution.
Similarly, in the case of V6lkerrecht or ius
genrium, Kant denies that states can ever
legitimately renounce their commitments within
the pacific federation, because no state would
willingly have joined the federation in the first
place, knowing that others could withdraw.
Kant explained that Weltburgerrecht or the ius
cosmopoliticum follows the same principles, by
close analogy with international law. Kant did
not imagine that everything public is necessarily
just, but rather that nothing political can ever be
just, that cannot be publicized, or acted on
openly.
Publicity discovers morality or rightness best
(including international right), only when a
lawful (rechtlich) state already exists. Kant's
ASLL*•
ASIL

conception of public right (6ffentliches Recht)
requires this lawful state or republic. Because
Kant believed that only a federative association
of states can lawfully support freedom, he
concluded that politics and morality will never
agree, until the federative union (Verein) is in
place.
Kant's transcendental concept of public right,
requiring publicity, captures a central element of
republican justice, which recognizes the
importance of public debate. Republics test ideas
by deliberation, and confirm them by votes.
Governments that act without submitting their
policies to public examination will make
mistakes about justice, by misunderstanding the
common good. Public deliberation clarifies
moral error by bringing all citizens' experience
and observations into play. This true and
convincing argument for popular sovereignty
becomes nonsense, however, when Kant twists it
to protect despotism. To publicize one's planned
revolution again non-republican tyrants would
be suicide. This does not mean that revolutions
should never happen. Secret plans against
oppression will be justified, when republican
deliberation would be subject to retaliation and
violence.
The Kantian Theory of Public
International Law
Reviewing Kant's arguments in Perpetual
Peace reveals the extent to which his conception
of right depended on natural law. Kant's two
maxims of universality and publicity provide the
natural law basis for all legitimate government
policy. The only legitimate governments (Kant
believed) would be those that implemented
republican institutions, as part of a republican
federation, to realize the moral rules that Kant's
moral maxims endorsed. Some preliminary
articles would be necessary to make the world
ready for republican government, but even
without them Kant expected that justice would
eventually prevail.
The central element of Kant's essay on
perpetual peace (his list of definitive articles) is
also his best and most convincing argument.
Kant believed that ius civitatis should rest on
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whatever political institutions (including the rule
of law) will best realize objective morality and
justice. This is true. He argues for a ius gentium
that will protect and coordinate these republics
in one large federation. This seems sensible.
Kant suggests that the ius cosmopoliticum
should encourage mutual non-hostility between
states. So it should. What Kant lacks is any
workable description of what will count as
republican forms of government, when applied
to the actual constitutions of states.
In this Kant resembles John Locke, useful for
the principles, but not for forms of government.
When Kant does offer specifics, they are weak
and unconvincing (as in his preliminary articles),
or pernicious (as in his strictures on revolution,
forbidding secrecy against tyrants). Kant's
argument for republican government is just and
convincing, but he never gives sufficient details
about what a republic will look like. This leaves
would-be Kantians strangely at sea, committed
to principles of liberty and justice, without clear
techniques for making them real. To find the
rechtliche
Verfassung,
republican
internationalists most look to other sources,
which is why they so seldom agree on what their
master would want. The Kantian Theory of
international law is a republican theory of
natural law, left deliberately vague, to encourage
the gradual development
of republican
institutions, in a world of illegitimate despots,
and lawless tyrannical states.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
School of Law

A CRITIQUE OF "KANTIAN INTERNATIONAL
LAW"
The Conception of "International Law"
and "States"
Harry
Gould
approaches
"Kantian
International Law" from a hypothetical
viewpoint, which prompts two criticisms
concerning: (1) Gould's lack of a lucid definition
of "international law; and (2) his lack of a lucid
definition of "the state."
ASIL •
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The Kantian-theory of international law,
sometimes referred to as "Neo-Kantian legal
theory," in some ways resembles the legal
theories developed by the late Hans Kelsen
(1881-1973). In his work, The Pure Theory of
Law, Kelsen generally suggests that public
international law should be regarded as similar
to the norms of municipal state law and should
be observed as norms of the same single
universal
legal
system.
(Hans
Kelsen,
Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory,
107-25, (Bonnie Litschewski & Stanley L.
Paulson trans., Clarendon Press)(1992); Hans
Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre-mit einem Anhang:
Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit, 328-45 (2nd ed.
1976)). The English translation of Professor
Kelsen's theory on the unity of international law
and state law put his view very clearly:
The only given is a cognitive unity of all law;
that is, one can conceive of international law
together with the state legal systems as unified
system of norms in exactly the same way as one
is accustomed to regarding the state legal system
as unity. This view, shared even by proponents
of the dualistic doctrine, reflects the
epistemological requirement that all law be
considered in one system, that it be considered
from one and the same standpoint as an integral
whole in itself. Because legal cognition aims to
comprehend as law - to comprehend within the
category of the valid legal norm - material
characterized as international law, as well as
material presenting itself as state law, legal
cognition sets the very same task for itself that
natural science sets for itself: to represent its
object as a unity. The negative criterion of this
unity is noncontradiction, a logical principle that
also applies to cognition in the realm of norms.
(Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory,
supra, at 111, 111(f), 112.)
However, Kelsen's influential legal theory is
contrary to other current theories on the
relationship of public international law,
municipal
law
(Hans
Kelsen,
Auseinandersetzungen zur Reinen Rechtslehre Kritische Bemerkungen zu Georges Scelle und
Michel Virally - Im Aufirag des Hans Kelsen Institutes aus dem Nachla3 herausgegeben von
Kurt Ringhofer und Robert Walter, 1-61, 111 et
seq. (New York: Springer Verlag 1987)), and
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